马基雅维里 君主论英文prince- 第7部分

because　of　their　being　too　many；　whilst　from　the　nobles　he　can　secure

himself；　as　they　are　few　in　number。　The　worst　that　a　prince　may　expect

from　a　hostile　people　is　to　be　abandoned　by　them；　but　from　hostile

nobles　he　has　not　only　to　fear　abandonment；　but　also　that　they　will　rise

against　him；　for　they；　being　in　these　affairs　more　far…seeing　and

astute；　always　e　forward　in　time　to　save　themselves；　and　to　obtain

favours　from　him　whom　they　expect　to　prevail。　Further；　the　prince　is

pelled　to　live　always　with　the　same　people；　but　he　can　do　well

without　the　same　nobles；　being　able　to　make　and　unmake　them　daily；　and

to　give　or　take　away　authority　when　it　pleases　him。



Therefore；　to　make　this　point　clearer；　I　say　that　the　nobles　ought　to　be

looked　at　mainly　in　two　ways：　that　is　to　say；　they　either　shape　their

course　in　such　a　way　as　binds　them　entirely　to　your　fortune；　or　they　do

not。　Those　who　so　bind　themselves；　and　are　not　rapacious；　ought　to　be

honoured　and　loved；　those　who　do　not　bind　themselves　may　be　dealt　with

in　two　ways；　they　may　fail　to　do　this　through　pusillanimity　and　a

natural　want　of　courage；　in　which　case　you　ought　to　make　use　of　them；

especially　of　those　who　are　of　good　counsel；　and　thus；　whilst　in

prosperity　you　honour　yourself；　in　adversity　you　have　not　to　fear　them。

But　when　for　their　own　ambitious　ends　they　shun　binding　themselves；　it

is　a　token　that　they　are　giving　more　thought　to　themselves　than　to　you；

and　a　prince　ought　to　guard　against　such；　and　to　fear　them　as　if　they

were　open　enemies；　because　in　adversity　they　always　help　to　ruin　him。



Therefore；　one　who　bees　a　prince　through　the　favour　of　the　people

ought　to　keep　them　friendly；　and　this　he　can　easily　do　seeing　they　only

ask　not　to　be　oppressed　by　him。　But　one　who；　in　opposition　to　the

people；　bees　a　prince　by　the　favour　of　the　nobles；　ought；　above

everything；　to　seek　to　win　the　people　over　to　himself；　and　this　he　may

easily　do　if　he　takes　them　under　his　protection。　Because　men；　when　they

receive　good　from　him　of　whom　they　were　expecting　evil；　are　bound　more

closely　to　their　benefactor；　thus　the　people　quickly　bee　more　devoted

to　him　than　if　he　had　been　raised　to　the　principality　by　their　favours；

and　the　prince　can　win　their　affections　in　many　ways；　but　as　these　vary

according　to　the　circumstances　one　cannot　give　fixed　rules；　so　I　omit

them；　but；　I　repeat；　it　is　necessary　for　a　prince　to　have　the　people

friendly；　otherwise　he　has　no　security　in　adversity。



Nabis；　Prince　of　the　Spartans；　sustained　the　attack　of　all　Greece；　and

of　a　victorious　Roman　army；　and　against　them　he　defended　his　country　and

his　government；　and　for　the　overing　of　this　peril　it　was　only

necessary　for　him　to　make　himself　secure　against　a　few；　but　this　would

not　have　been　sufficient　if　the　people　had　been　hostile。　And　do　not　let

any　one　impugn　this　statement　with　the　trite　proverb　that　'He　who　builds

on　the　people；　builds　on　the　mud；'　for　this　is　true　when　a　private

citizen　makes　a　foundation　there；　and　persuades　himself　that　the　people

will　free　him　when　he　is　oppressed　by　his　enemies　or　by　the　magistrates；

wherein　he　would　find　himself　very　often　deceived；　as　happened　to　the

Gracchi　in　Rome　and　to　Messer　Giorgio　Scali　in　Florence。　But　granted　a

prince　who　has　established　himself　as　above；　who　can　mand；　and　is　a

man　of　courage；　undismayed　in　adversity；　who　does　not　fail　in　other

qualifications；　and　who；　by　his　resolution　and　energy；　keeps　the　whole

people　encouraged　　such　a　one　will　never　find　himself　deceived　in

them；　and　it　will　be　shown　that　he　has　laid　his　foundations　well。



These　principalities　are　liable　to　danger　when　they　are　passing　from　the

civil　to　the　absolute　order　of　government；　for　such　princes　either　rule

personally　or　through　magistrates。　In　the　latter　case　their　government

is　weaker　and　more　insecure；　because　it　rests　entirely　on　the　goodwill

of　those　citizens　who　are　raised　to　the　magistracy；　and　who；　especially

in　troubled　times；　can　destroy　the　government　with　great　ease；　either　by

intrigue　or　open　defiance；　and　the　prince　has　not　the　chance　amid

tumults　to　exercise　absolute　authority；　because　the　citizens　and

subjects；　accustomed　to　receive　orders　from　magistrates；　are　not　of　a

mind　to　obey　him　amid　these　confusions；　and　there　will　always　be　in

doubtful　times　a　scarcity　of　men　whom　he　can　trust。　For　such　a　prince

cannot　rely　upon　what　he　observes　in　quiet　times；　when　citizens　had　need

of　the　state；　because　then　every　one　agrees　with　him；　they　all　promise；

and　when　death　is　far　distant　they　all　wish　to　die　for　him；　but　in

troubled　times；　when　the　state　has　need　of　its　citizens；　then　he　finds

but　few。　And　so　much　the　more　is　this　experiment　dangerous；　inasmuch　as

it　can　only　be　tried　once。　Therefore　a　wise　prince　ought　to　adopt　such　a

course　that　his　citizens　will　always　in　every　sort　and　kind　of

circumstance　have　need　of　the　state　and　of　him；　and　then　he　will　always

find　them　faithful。



CHAPTER　X



CONCERNING　THE　WAY　IN　WHICH　THE　STRENGTH　OF　ALL　PRINCIPALITIES　OUGHT　TO

BE　MEASURED



IT　IS　necessary　to　consider　another　point　in　examining　the　character　of

these　principalities：　that　is；　whether　a　prince　has　such　power　that；　in

case　of　need；　he　can　support　himself　with　his　own　resources；　or　whether

he　has　always　need　of　the　assistance　of　others。　And　to　make　this　quite

clear　I　say　that　I　consider　those　are　able　to　support　themselves　by

their　own　resources　who　can；　either　by　abundance　of　men　or　money；　raise

a　sufficient　army　to　join　battle　against　any　one　who　es　to　attack

them；　and　I　consider　those　always　to　have　need　of　others　who　cannot　show

themselves　against　the　enemy　in　the　field；　but　are　forced　to　defend

themselves　by　sheltering　behind　walls。　The　first　case　has　been

discussed；　but　we　will　speak　of　it　again　should　it　recur。　In　the　second

case　one　can　say　nothing　except　to　encourage　such　princes　to　provision

and　fortify　their　towns；　and　not　on　any　account　to　defend　the　country。

And　whoever　shall　fortify　his　town　well；　and　shall　have　managed　the

other　concerns　of　his　subjects　in　the　way　stated　above；　and　to　be　often

repeated；　will　never　be　attacked　without　great　caution；　for　men　are

always　adverse　to　enterprises　where　difficulties　can　be　seen；　and　it

will　be　seen　not　to　be　an　easy　thing　to　attack　one　who　has　his　town　well

fortified；　and　is　not　hated　by　his　people。



The　cities　of　Germany　are　absolutely　free；　they　own　but　little　country

around　them；　and　they　yield　obedience　to　the　emperor　when　it　suits　them；

nor　do　they　fear　this　or　any　other　power　they　may　have　near　them；

because　they　are　fortified　in　such　a　way　that　every　one　thinks　the

taking　of　them　by　assault　would　be　tedious　and　difficult；　seeing　they

have　proper　ditches　and　walls；　they　have　sufficient　artillery；　and　they

always　keep　in　public　depots　enough　for　one　year's　eating；　drinking；　and

firing。　And　beyond　this；　to　keep　the　people　quiet　and　without　loss　to

the　state；　they　always　have　the　means　of　giving　work　to　the　munity　in

those　labours　that　are　the　life　and　strength　of　the　city；　and　on　the

pursuit　of　which　the　people　are　supported；　they　also　hold　military

exercises　in　repute；　and　moreover　have　many　ordinances　to　uphold　them。



Therefore；　a　prince　who　has　a　strong　city；　and　had　not　made　himself

odious；　will　not　be　attacked；　or　if　any　one　should　attack　he　will　only

be　driven　off　with　disgrace；　again；　because　that　affairs　of　this　world

are　so　changeable；　it　is　almost　impossible　to　keep　an　army　a　whole　year

in　the　field　without　being　interfered　with。　And　whoever　should　reply：　If

the　people　have　property　outside　the　city；　and　see　it　burnt；　they　will

not　remain　patient；　and　the　long　siege　and　self…interest　will　make　them

forget　their　prince；　to　this　I　answer　that　a　powerful　and　courageous

prince　will　overe　all　such　difficulties　by　giving　at　one　time　hope　to

his　subjects　that　the　evil　will　not　be　for　long；　at　another　time　fear　of

the　cruelty　of　the　enemy；　then　preserving　himself　adroitly　from　those

subjects　who　seem　to　him　to　be　too　bold。



Further；　the　enemy　would　naturally　on　his　arrival　at　once　burn　and　ruin

the　country　at　the　time　when　the　spirits　of　the　people　are　still　hot　and

ready　for　the　defence；　and；　therefore；　so　much　the　less　ought　the　prince

to　hesitate；　because　after　a　time；　when　spirits　have　cooled；　the　damage

is　already　done；　the　ills　are　incurred；　and　there　is　no　longer　any

remedy；　and　therefore　they　are　so　much　the　more　ready　to　unite　with

their　prince；　he　appearing　to　be　under　obligations　to　them　now　that

their　houses　have　been　burnt　and　their　possessions　ruined　in　his

defence。　For　it　is　the　nature　of　men　to　be　bound　by　the　benefits　they

confer　as　much　as　by　those　they　receive。　Therefore；　if　everything　is

well　considered；　it　wilt　not　be　difficult　for　a　wise　prince　to　keep　the

minds　of　his　citizens　steadfast　from　first　to　last；　when　he　does　not

fail　to　support　and　defend　them。



CHAPTER　XI



CONCERNING　ECCLESIASTICAL　PRINCIPALITIES



IT　ONLY　remains　now　to　speak　of　ecclesiastical　principalities；　touching

which　all　difficulties　are　prior　to　getting　possession；　because　they　are

acquired　either　by　capacity　or　good　fortune；　and　they　can　be　held

without　either；　for　they　are　sustained　by　the　ordinances　of　religion；

which　are　so　all…powerful；　and　of　such　a　character　that　the

principalities　may　be　held　no　matter　how　their　princes　behave　and　live。

These　princes　alone　have　states　and　do　not　defend　them；　they　have

subjects　and　do　not　rule　them；　and　the　states；　although　unguarded；　are

not　taken　from　them；　and　the　subjects；　although　not　ruled；　do　not　care；

and　they　have　neither　the　desire　nor　the　ability　to　alienate　themselves。

Such　principalities　only　are　secure　and　happy。　But　being　upheld　by

powers；　to　which　the　human　mind　cannot　reach；　I　shall　speak　no　more　of

them；　because；　being　exalted　and　maintained　by　God；　it　would　be　the　act

of　a　presumptuous　and　ras