马基雅维里 君主论英文prince- 第14部分

caused　him　to　be　beloved　by　the　armies。　Nevertheless；　his　ferocity　and

cruelties　were　so　great　and　so　unheard　of　that；　after　endless　single

murders；　he　killed　a　large　number　of　the　people　of　Rome　and　all　those　of

Alexandria。　He　became　hated　by　the　whole　world；　and　also　feared　by　those

he　had　around　him；　to　such　an　extent　that　he　was　murdered　in　the　midst

of　his　army　by　a　centurion。　And　here　it　must　be　noted　that　such…like

deaths；　which　are　deliberately　inflicted　with　a　resolved　and　desperate

courage；　cannot　be　avoided　by　princes；　because　any　one　who　does　not　fear

to　die　can　inflict　them；　but　a　prince　may　fear　them　the　less　because

they　are　very　rare；　he　has　only　to　be　careful　not　to　do　any　grave　injury

to　those　whom　he　employs　or　has　around　him　in　the　service　of　the　state。

Antoninus　had　not　taken　this　care；　but　had　contumeliously　killed　a

brother　of　that　centurion；　whom　also　he　daily　threatened；　yet　retained

in　his　bodyguard；　which；　as　it　turned　out；　was　a　rash　thing　to　do；　and

proved　the　emperor's　ruin。



But　let　us　e　to　modus；　to　whom　it　should　have　been　very　easy　to

hold　the　empire；　for；　being　the　son　of　Marcus；　he　had　inherited　it；　and

he　had　only　to　follow　in　the　footsteps　of　his　father　to　please　his

people　and　soldiers；　but；　being　by　nature　cruel　and　brutal；　he　gave

himself　up　to　amusing　the　soldiers　and　corrupting　them；　so　that　he　might

indulge　his　rapacity　upon　the　people；　on　the　other　hand；　not　maintaining

his　dignity；　often　descending　to　the　theatre　to　pete　with　gladiators；

and　doing　other　vile　things；　little　worthy　of　the　imperial　majesty；　he

fell　into　contempt　with　the　soldiers；　and　being　hated　by　one　party　and

despised　by　the　other；　he　was　conspired　against　and　killed。



It　remains　to　discuss　the　character　of　Maximinus。　He　was　a　very　warlike

man；　and　the　armies；　being　disgusted　with　the　effeminacy　of　Alexander；

of　whom　I　have　already　spoken；　killed　him　and　elected　Maximinus　to　the

throne。　This　he　did　not　possess　for　long；　for　two　things　made　him　hated

and　despised；　the　one；　his　having　kept　sheep　in　Thrace；　which　brought

him　into　contempt　（it　being　well　known　to　all；　and　considered　a　great

indignity　by　every　one）；　and　the　other；　his　having　at　the　accession　to

his　dominions　deferred　going　to　Rome　and　taking　possession　of　the

imperial　seat；　he　had　also　gained　a　reputation　for　the　utmost　ferocity

by　having；　through　his　prefects　in　Rome　and　elsewhere　in　the　empire；

practised　many　cruelties；　so　that　the　whole　world　was　moved　to　anger　at

the　meanness　of　his　birth　and　to　fear　at　his　barbarity。　First　Africa

rebelled；　then　the　Senate　with　all　the　people　of　Rome；　and　all　Italy

conspired　against　him；　to　which　may　be　added　his　own　army：　this　latter；

besieging　Aquileia　and　meeting　with　difficulties　in　taking　it；　were

disgusted　with　his　cruelties；　and　fearing　him　less　when　they　found　so

many　against　him；　murdered　him。



I　do　not　wish　to　discuss　Heliogabalus；　Macrinus；　or　Julian；　who；　being

thoroughly　contemptible；　were　quickly　wiped　out；　but　I　will　bring　this

discourse　to　a　conclusion　by　saying　that　princes　in　our　times　have　this

difficulty　of　giving　inordinate　satisfaction　to　their　soldiers　in　a　far

less　degree；　because；　notwithstanding　one　has　to　give　them　some

indulgence；　that　is　soon　done；　none　of　these　princes　have　armies　that

are　veterans　in　the　governance　and　administration　of　provinces；　as　were

the　armies　of　the　Roman　Empire；　and　whereas　it　was　then　more　necessary

to　give　satisfaction　to　the　soldiers　than　to　the　people；　it　is　now　more

necessary　to　all　princes；　except　the　Turk　and　the　Soldan；　to　satisfy　the

people　rather　than　the　soldiers；　because　the　people　are　the　more

powerful。



From　the　above　I　have　excepted　the　Turk；　who　always　keeps　round　him

twelve　infantry　and　fifteen　thousand　cavalry　on　which　depend　the

security　and　strength　of　the　kingdom；　and　it　is　necessary　that；　putting

aside　every　consideration　for　the　people；　he　should　keep　them　his

friends。　The　kingdom　of　the　Soldan　is　similar；　being　entirely　in　the

hands　of　soldiers；　follows　again　that；　without　regard　to　the　people；　he

must　keep　them　his　friends。　But　you　must　note　that　the　state　of　the

Soldan　is　unlike　all　other　principalities；　for　the　reason　that　it　is

like　the　Christian　pontificate；　which　cannot　be　called　either　an

hereditary　or　a　newly　formed　principality；　because　the　sons　of　the　old

prince　not　the　heirs；　but　he　who　is　elected　to　that　position　by　those

who　have　authority；　and　the　sons　remain　only　noblemen。　And　this　being　an

ancient　custom；　it　cannot　be　called　a　new　principality；　because　there

are　none　of　those　difficulties　in　it　that　are　met　with　in　new　ones；　for

although　the　prince　is　new；　the　constitution　of　the　state　is　old；　and　it

is　framed　so　as　to　receive　him　as　if　he　were　its　hereditary　lord。



But　returning　to　the　subject　of　our　discourse；　I　say　that　whoever　will

consider　it　will　acknowledge　that　either　hatred　or　contempt　has　been

fatal　to　the　above…named　emperors；　and　it　will　be　recognized　also　how　it

happened　that；　a　number　of　them　acting　in　one　way　and　a　number　in

another；　only　one　in　each　way　came　to　a　happy　end　and　the　rest　to

unhappy　ones。　Because　it　would　have　been　useless　and　dangerous　for

Pertinax　and　Alexander；　being　new　princes；　to　imitate　Marcus；　who　was

heir　to　the　principality；　and　likewise　it　would　have　been　utterly

destructive　to　Caracalla；　modus；　and　Maximinus　to　have　imitated

Severus；　they　not　having　sufficient　valour　to　enable　them　to　tread　in

his　footsteps。　Therefore　a　prince；　new　to　the　principality；　cannot

imitate　the　actions　of　Marcus；　nor；　again；　is　it　necessary　to　follow

those　of　Severus；　but　he　ought　to　take　from　Severus　those　parts　which

are　necessary　to　found　his　state；　and　from　Marcus　those　which　are　proper

and　glorious　to　keep　a　state　that　may　already　be　stable　and　firm。



CHAPTER　XX



ARE　FORTRESSES；　AND　MANY　OTHER　THINGS　TO　WHICH　PRINCES　OFTEN　RESORT；

ADVANTAGEOUS　OR　HURTFUL？



1。　SOME　princes；　so　as　to　hold　securely　the　state；　have　disarmed　their

subjects；　others　have　kept　their　subject　towns　by　factions；　others　have

fostered　enmities　against　themselves；　others　have　laid　themselves　out　to

gain　over　those　whom　they　distrusted　in　the　beginning　of　their

governments；　some　have　built　fortresses；　some　have　overthrown　and

destroyed　them。　And　although　one　cannot　give　a　final　judgment　on　all　one

of　these　things　unless　one　possesses　the　particulars　of　those　states　in

which　a　decision　has　to　be　made；　nevertheless　I　will　speak　as

prehensively　as　the　matter　of　itself　will　admit。



2。　There　never　was　a　new　prince　who　has　disarmed　his　subjects；　rather

when　he　has　found　them　disarmed　he　has　always　armed　them；　because；　by

arming　them；　those　arms　bee　yours；　those　men　who　were　distrusted

bee　faithful；　and　those　who　were　faithful　are　kept　so；　and　your

subjects　bee　your　adherents。　And　whereas　all　subjects　cannot　be

armed；　yet　when　those　whom　you　do　arm　are　benefited；　the　others　can　be

handled　more　freely；　and　this　difference　in　their　treatment；　which　they

quite　understand；　makes　the　former　your　dependants；　and　the　latter；

considering　it　to　be　necessary　that　those　who　have　the　most　danger　and

service　should　have　the　most　reward；　excuse　you。　But　when　you　disarm

them；　you　at　once　offend　them　by　showing　that　you　distrust　them；　either

for　cowardice　or　for　want　of　loyalty；　and　either　of　these　opinions

breeds　hatred　against　you。　And　because　you　cannot　remain　unarmed；　it

follows　that　you　turn　to　mercenaries；　which　are　of　the　character　already

shown；　even　if　they　should　be　good　they　would　not　be　sufficient　to

defend　you　against　powerful　enemies　and　distrusted　subjects。　Therefore；

as　I　have　said；　a　new　prince　in　a　new　principality　has　always

distributed　arms。　Histories　are　full　of　examples。　But　when　a　prince

acquires　a　new　state；　which　he　adds　as　a　province　to　his　old　one；　then

it　is　necessary　to　disarm　the　men　of　that　state；　except　those　who　have

been　his　adherents　in　acquiring　it；　and　these　again；　with　time　and

opportunity；　should　be　rendered　soft　and　effeminate；　and　matters　should

be　managed　in　such　a　way　that　all　the　armed　men　in　the　state　shall　be

your　own　soldiers　who　in　your　old　state　were　living　near　you。



3。　Our　forefathers；　and　those　who　were　reckoned　wise；　were　accustomed　to

say　that　it　was　necessary　to　hold　Pistoia　by　factions　and　Pisa　by

fortresses；　and　with　this　idea　they　fostered　quarrels　in　some　of　their

tributary　towns　so　as　to　keep　possession　of　them　the　more　easily。　This

may　have　been　well　enough　in　those　times　when　Italy　was　in　a　way

balanced；　but　I　do　not　believe　that　it　can　be　accepted　as　a　precept　for

to…day；　because　I　do　not　believe　that　factions　can　ever　be　of　use；

rather　it　is　certain　that　when　the　enemy　es　upon　you　in　divided

cities　you　are　quickly　lost；　because　the　weakest　party　will　always

assist　the　outside　forces　and　the　other　will　not　be　able　to　resist。　The

Venetians；　moved；　as　I　believe；　by　the　above　reasons；　fostered　the

Guelph　and　Ghibelline　factions　in　their　tributary　cities；　and　although

they　never　allowed　them　to　e　to　bloodshed；　yet　they　nursed　these

disputes　amongst　them；　so　that　the　citizens；　distracted　by　their

differences；　should　not　unite　against　them。　Which；　as　we　saw；　did　not

afterwards　turn　out　as　expected；　because；　after　the　rout　at　Vaila；　one

party　at　once　took　courage　and　seized　the　state。　Such　methods　argue；

therefore；　weakness　in　the　prince；　because　these　factions　will　never　be

permitted　in　a　vigorous　principality；　such　methods　for　enabling　one　the

more　easily　to　manage　subjects　are　only　useful　in　times　of　peace；　but　if

war　es　this　policy　proves　fallacious。



4。　Without　doubt　princes　bee　great　when　they　overe　the

difficulties　and　obstacles　by　which　they　are　confronted；　and　therefore

fortune；　especially　when　she　desires　to　make　a　new　prince　great；　who　has

a　greater　necessity　to　earn　renown　than　an　hereditary　one；　causes

enemies　to　arise　and　form　designs