milne to be eseheir or not？ The law sayes thereto nay； and be this reason； For it is ane dead thing； and ane dead thing may do na fellony； nor be made escheit throw their gilt。 Swa the milne in this case is not culpable； and in the law it is lawfull to the lord of the land to haue ane mylne on his awin water quhere best likes him。〃 /2/
The reader will see in this passage； as has been remarked already of the Roman law； that a distinction is taken between things which are capable of guilt and those which ＇22＇ are not；between living and dead things； but he will also see that no difficulty was felt in treating animals as guilty。
Take next an early passage of the English law； a report of what was laid down by one of the English judges。 In 1333 it was stated for law； that； 〃if my dog kills your sheep； and I； freshly after the fact； tender you the dog； you are without recovery against me。〃 /l / More than three centuries later； in 1676； it was said by Twisden； J。 that； 〃if one hath kept a tame fox； which gets loose and grows wild； he that hath kept him before shall not answer for the damage the fox doth after he hath lost him； and he hath resumed his wild nature。〃 /2/ It is at least doubtful whether that sentence ever would have been written but for the lingering influence of the notion that the ground of the owner's liability was his ownership of the offending： thing and his failure to surrender it。 When the fox escaped； by another principle of law the ownership was at an end。 In fact； that very consideration was seriously pressed in England as late as 1846； with regard to a monkey which escaped and bit the plaintiff； /3/ So it seems to be a reasonable conjecture； that it was this way of thinking which 1ed Lord Holt； near the beginning of the last century； to intimate that one ground on which a man is bound at his peril to restrain cattle from trespassing is that he has valuable property in such animals； whereas he has not dogs； for which his responsibility is less。 /4/ To this day； in fact； cautious judges state the law as to cattle to be； that； 〃if I am the owner of an animal in which by law the ＇23＇ right of property can exist； I am bound to take care that it does not stray into the land of my neighbor。〃 /1/
I do not mean that our modern law on this subject is only a survival； and that the only change from primitive notions was to substitute the owner for the offending animal。 For although it is probable that the early law was one of the causes which led to the modern doctrine； there has been too much good sense in every stage of our law to adopt any such sweeping consequences as would follow from the wholesale transfer of liability supposed。 An owner is not bound at his peril to keep his cattle from harming his neighbor's person。 /2/ And in some of the earliest instances of personal liability； even for trespass on a neighbor's land； the ground seems to have been the owner's negligence。 /3/
It is the nature of those animals which the common law recognizes as the subject of ownership to stray； and when straying to do damage by trampling down and eating crops。 At the same time it is usual and easy to restrain them。 On the other hand； a dog； which is not the subject of property； does no harm by simply crossing the land of others than its owner。 Hence to this extent the new law might have followed the old。 The right of property in the ＇24＇ offending animal； which was the ancient ground of responsibility； might have been adopted safely enough as the test of a liability based on the fault of the owner。 But the responsibility for damage of a kind not to be expected from such animals is determined on grounds of policy comparatively little disturbed by tradition。 The development of personal liability for fierce wild animals at Rome has been explained。 Our law seems to have followed the Roman。
We will now follow the history of that branch of the primitive notion which was least likely to survive；the liability of inanimate things。
It will be remembered that King Alfred ordained the surrender of a tree； but that the later Scotch law refused it because a dead thing could not have guilt。 It will be remembered； also； that the animals which the Scotch law forfeited were escheat to the king。 The same thing has remained true in England until well into this century； with regard even to inanimate objects。 As long ago as Bracton； /1/ in case a man was slain； the coroner was to value the object causing the death； and that was to be forfeited sa deodand 〃pro rege。〃 It was to be given to God； that is to say to the Church； for the king； to be expended for the good of his soul。 A man's death had ceased to be the private affair of his friends as in the time of the barbarian folk…laws。 The king； who furnished the court； now sued for the penalty。 He supplanted the family in the claim on the guilty thing； and the Church supplanted him。
In Edward the First's time some of the cases remind of the barbarian laws at their rudest stage。 If a man fell from a tree； the tree was deodand。 /2/ If he drowned in a ＇25＇ well； the well was to be filled up。 /1/ It did not matter that the forfeited instrument belonged to an innocent person。〃 Where a man killeth another with the sword of John at Stile； the sword shall be forfeit as deodand； and yet no default is in the owner。〃 /2/ That is from a book written in the reign of Henry VIII。； about 1530。 And it has been repeated from Queen Elizabeth's time /3/ to within one hundred years； /4/ that if my horse strikes a man； and afterwards I sell my horse； and after that the man dies； the horse shall be forfeited。 Hence it is； that； in all indictments for homicide； until very lately it has been necessary to state the instrument causing the death and its value； as that the stroke was given by a certain penknife； value sixpence； so as to secure the forfeiture。 It is said that a steam…engine has been forfeited in this way。
I now come to what I regard as the most remarkable transformation of this principle； and one which is a most important factor in our law as it is today。 I must for the moment leave the common law and take up the doctrines of the Admiralty。 In the early books which have just been referred to； and long afterwards； the fact of motion is adverted to as of much importance。 A maxim of Henry Spigurnel； a judge in the time of Edward I。； is reported； that 〃where a man is killed by a cart； or by the fall of a house； or in other like manner； and the thing in motion is the cause of the death； it shall be deodand。〃 /5/ So it was ＇26＇ said in the next reign that 〃oinne illud quod mover cum eo quod occidit homines deodandum domino Regi erit； vel feodo clerici。〃 /l / The reader sees how motion gives life to the object forfeited。
The most striking example of this sort is a ship。 And accordingly the old books say that； if a man falls from a ship and is drowned； the motion of the ship must be taken to cause the death； and the ship is forfeited； provided； however； that this happens in fresh water。 /2/ For if the death took place on the high seas； that was outside the ordinary jurisdiction。 This proviso has been supposed to mean that ships at sea were not forfeited； /3/ but there is a long series of petitions to the king in Parliament that such forfeitures may be done away with； which tell a different story。 /4/ The truth seems to be that the forfeiture took place； but in a different court。 A manuscript of the reign of Henry VI。； only recently printed； discloses the fact that； if a man was killed or drowned at sea by the motion of the ship； the vessel was forfeited to the admiral upon a proceeding in the admiral's court； and subject to release by favor of the admiral or the king。 /5/
A ship is the most living of inanimate things。 Servants sometimes say 〃she〃 of a clock； but every one gives a gender to vessels。 And we need not be surprised； therefore； to find a mode of dealing which has shown such extraordinary vitality in the criminal law applied with even more striking thoroughness in the Admiralty。 It is only by supposing ＇27＇ the ship to have been treated as if endowed with personality； that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the maritime law can be made intelligible； and on that supposition they at once become consistent and logical。
By way of seeing what those peculiarities are； take first a case of collision at sea。 A collision takes place between two vessels； the Ticonderoga and the Melampus； through the fault of the Ticonderoga alone。 That ship is under a lease at the time； the lessee has his own master in charge； and the owner of the vessel has no manner of control over it。 The owner； therefore； is not to blame； and he cannot even be charged on the ground that the damage was done by his servants。 He is free from personal liability on elementary principles。 Yet it is perfectly settled that there is a lien on his vessel for the amount of the damage done； /1/ and this means that that vessel may be arrested and sold to pay the loss in any admiralty court whose process will reach her。 If a livery…stable keeper lets a horse and wagon to a customer； who runs a man down by careless driving； no one would think of claiming a right to seize the horse and wagon。 It would be seen that the only property which could be sold to pay for a wrong was the property of the wrong…doer。
But； again； suppose that the vessel； instead of being under lease； is in charge of a pilot whose employment is made compulsory by the laws of the port which she is just entering。 The Supreme Court of the United States holds the ship liable in this instance also。 /2/ The English courts would probably have decided otherwise； and the matter is settled in England by legislation。 But there the court of appeal； the Privy Council； has been largely composed of common…law ＇28＇lawyers； and it has shown a marked tendency to assimilate common…law doctrine。 At common law one who could not impose a personal liability on the owner could not bind a particular chattel to answer for a wrong of which it had been the instrument。 But our Supreme Court has long recognized that a person may bind a ship； when he could not bind the owners personally； because he was not the agent。
It may be admitted that； if this doctrine were not supported by an appearance of good sen