the common law- 第37部分

In　an　article　in　the　American　Law　Review　/4/　I　referred　＇232＇　to　an　expression　of　Godefroi　with　regard　to　agents；　eadem　est　persona　domini　et　procuratoris。　/1/　This　notion　of　a　fictitious　unity　of　person　has　been　pronounced　a　darkening　of　counsel　in　a　recent　useful　work。　/2/　But　it　receives　the　sanction　of　Sir　Henry　Maine；　/3/　and　I　believe　that　it　must　stand　as　expressing　an　important　aspect　of　the　law；　if；　as　I　have　tried　to　show；　there　is　no　adequate　and　complete　explanation　of　the　modern　law；　except　by　the　survival　in　practice　of　rules　which　lost　their　true　meaning　when　the　objects　of　them　ceased　to　be　slaves。　There　is　no　trouble　in　understanding　what　is　meant　by　saying　that　a　slave　has　no　legal　standing；　but　is　absorbed　in　the　family　which　his　master　represents　before　the　law。　The　meaning　seems　equally　clear　when　we　say　that　a　free　servant；　in　his　relations　as　such；　is　in　many　respects　likened　by　the　law　to　a　slave　（not；　of　course；　to　his　own　detriment　as　a　freeman）。　The　next　step　is　simply　that　others　not　servants　in　a　general　sense　may　be　treated　as　if　servants　in　a　particular　connection。　This　is　the　progress　of　ideas　as　shown　us　by　history；　and　this　is　what　is　meant　by　saying　that　the　characteristic　feature　which　justifies　agency　as　a　title　of　the　law　is　the　absorption　pro　hac　vice　of　the　agent's　legal　individuality　in　that　of　his　principal。

If　this　were　carried　out　logically；　it　would　follow　that　an　agent　constituted　to　hold　possession　in　his　principal's　name　would　not　be　regarded　as　having　the　legal　possession；　or　as　entitled　to　trespass。　But；　after　what　has　been　said；　no　opinion　can　be　expressed　whether　the　law　would　go　so　far；　unless　it　is　shown　by　precedent。　/4/　The　nature　of　the　case　＇233＇　will　be　observed。　It　is　that　of　an　agent　constituted　for　the　very　point　and　purpose　of　possession。　A　bailee　may　be　an　agent　for　some　other　purpose。　A　free　servant　may　be　made　a　bailee。　But　the　bailee　holds　in　his　own　as　we　say；　following　the　Roman　idiom；　and　the　servant　or　agent　holding　as　such　does　not。

It　would　hardly　be　worth　while；　if　space　allowed；　to　search　the　books　on　this　subject；　because　of　the　great　confusion　of　language　to　be　found　in　them。　It　has　been　said；　for　instance；　in　this　connection；　that　a　carrier　is　a　servant；　/1/　while　nothing　can　be　clearer　than　that；　while　goods　are　in　custody；　they　are　in　his　possession。　/2/　So　where　goods　remain　in　the　custody　of　a　vendor；　appropriation　to　the　contract　and　acceptance　have　been　confounded　with　delivery。　/3/　Our　law　has　adopted　the　Roman　doctrine；　/4/　that　there　may　be　a　delivery；　that　is；　a　change　of　possession；　by　a　change　in　the　character　in　which　the　vendor　holds；　but　has　not　always　imitated　the　caution　of　the　civilians　with　regard　to　what　amounts　to　such　a　change。　/5/　Bailees　are　constantly　spoken　of　as　if　they　were　agents　to　possess；a　confusion　made　＇234＇　easier　by　the　fact　that　they　generally　are　agents　for　other　purposes。　Those　cases　which　attribute　possession　to　a　transferee　of　goods　in　the　hands　of　a　middleman；　/1/　without　distinguishing　whether　the　middleman　holds　in　his　own　name　or　the　buyer's；　are　generally　right　in　the　result；　no　doubt；　but　have　added　to　the　confusion　of　thought　upon　the　subject。

German　writers　are　a　little　apt　to　value　a　theory　of　possession　somewhat　in　proportion　to　the　breadth　of　the　distinction　which　it　draws　between　juridical　possession　and　actual　detention；　but；　from　the　point　of　view　taken　here；　it　will　be　seen　that　the　grounds　for　denying　possession　and　the　possessory　remedies　to　servants　and　agents　holding　as　suchif；　indeed；　the　latter　have　not　those　remediesare　merely　historical；　and　that　the　general　theory　can　only　take　account　of　the　denial　as　an　anomaly。　It　will　also　be　perceived　that　the　ground　on　which　servants　and　depositaries　have　been　often　likened　to　each　other；　namely；　that　they　both　hold　for　the　benefit　of　another　and　not　for　themselves；　is　wholly　without　influence　on　our　law；　which　has　always　treated　depositaries　as　having　possession；　and　is　not　the　true　explanation　of　the　Roman　doctrine；　which　did　not　decide　either　case　upon　that　ground；　and　which　decided　each　for　reasons　different　from　those　on　which　it　decided　the　other。

It　will　now　be　easy　to　deal　with　the　question　of　power　as　to　third　persons。　This　is　naturally　a　power　coextensive　with　the　intent。　But　we　must　bear　in　mind　that　the　law　deals　only　or　mainly　with　manifested　facts；　and　hence；　when　we　speak　of　a　power　to　exclude　others；　we　mean　no　more　than　a　power　which　so　appears　in　its　manifestation。　＇235＇　A　ruffian　may　be　within　equal　reach　and　sight　when　a　child　picks　up　a　pocket…book；　but　if　he　does　nothing；　the　child　has　manifested　the　needful　power　as　well　as　if　it　had　been　backed　by　a　hundred　policemen。　Thus　narrowed；　it　might　be　suggested　that　the　manifestation　of　is　only　important　as　a　manifestation　of　intent。　But　the　two　things　are　distinct；　and　the　former　becomes　decisive　when　there　are　two　contemporaneous　and　conflicting　intents。　Thus；　where　two　parties；　neither　having　title；　claimed　a　crop　of　corn　adversely　to　each　other；　and　cultivated　it　alternately；　and　the　plaintiff　gathered　and　threw　it　in　small　piles　in　the　same　field；　where　it　lay　for　a　week；　and　then　each　party　simultaneously　began　to　carry　it　away；　it　was　held　the　plaintiff　had　not　gained　possession。　/1/　But　the　first　interference　of　the　defendant　had　been　after　the　gathering　into　piles；　the　plaintiff　would　probably　have　recovered。　/2/　So　where　trustees　possessed　of　a　schoolroom　put　in　a　schoolmaster；　and　he　was　afterwards　dismissed；　but　the　next　day　（June　30）　re…entered　by　force；　on　the　fourth　of　July　he　was　required　by　notice　to　depart；　and　was　not　ejected　until　the　eleventh；　it　was　considered　that　the　schoolmaster　never　got　possession　as　against　the　trustees。　/3/

We　are　led；　in　this　connection；　to　the　subject　of　the　continuance　of　the　rights　acquired　by　gaining　possession。　To　gain　possession；　it　has　been　seen；　there　must　be　certain　physical　relations；　as　explained；　and　a　certain　intent。　It　remains　to　be　inquired；　how　far　these　facts　must　continue　＇236＇　to　be　presently　true　of　a　person　in　order　that　he　may　keep　the　rights　which　follow　from　their　presence。　The　prevailing　view　is　that　of　Savigny。　He　thinks　that　there　must　be　always　the　same　animus　as　at　the　moment　of　acquisition；　and　a　constant　power　to　reproduce　at　will　the　original　physical　relations　to　the　object。　Every　one　agrees　that　it　is　not　necessary　to　have　always　a　present　power　over　the　thing；　otherwise　one　could　only　possess　what　was　under　his　hand。　But　it　is　a　question　whether　we　cannot　dispense　with　even　more。　The　facts　which　constitute　possession　are　in　their　nature　capable　of　continuing　presently　true　for　a　lifetime。　Hence　there　has　arisen　an　ambiguity　of　language　which　has　led　to　much　confusion　of　thought。　We　use　the　word　〃possession；〃　indifferently；　to　signify　the　presence　of　all　the　facts　needful　to　gain　it；　and　also　the　condition　of　him　who；　although　some　of　them　no　longer　exist；　is　still　protected　as　if　they　did。　Consequently　it　has　been　only　too　easy　to　treat　the　cessation　of　the　facts　as　the　loss　of　the　right；　as　some　German　writers　very　nearly　do。　/1/

But　it　no　more　follows；　from　the　single　circumstance　that　certain　facts　must　concur　in　order　to　create　the　rights　incident　to　possession；　that　they　must　continue　in　order　to　keep　those　rights　alive；　than　it　does；　from　the　necessity　of　a　consideration　and　a　promise　to　create　a　right　ex　contractu；　that　the　consideration　and　promise　must　continue　moving　between　the　parties　until　the　moment　of　performance。　When　certain　facts　have　once　been　made　manifest　which　confer　a　right；　there　is　no　general　ground　on　which　the　law　need　hold　the　right　at　an　end　except　the　manifestation　of　some　fact　inconsistent　with　its　continuance；　＇237＇　the　reasons　for　conferring　the　particular　right　have　great　weight　in　determining　what　facts　shall　be　to　be　so。　Cessation　of　the　original　physical　relations　to　the　object　might　be　treated　as　such　a　fact；　but　it　never　has　been；　unless　in　times　of　more　ungoverned　violence　than　the　present。　On　the　same　principle；　it　is　only　a　question　of　tradition　or　policy　whether　a　cessation　of　the　power　to　reproduce　the　original　physical　relations　shall　affect　the　continuance　of　the　rights。　It　does　not　stand　on　the　same　ground　as　a　new　possession　adversely　taken　by　another。　We　have　adopted　the　Roman　law　as　to　animals　ferae　naturae；　but　the　general　tendency　of　our　law　is　to　favor　appropriation。　It　abhors　the　absence　of　proprietary　or　possessory　rights　as　a　kind　of　vacuum。　Accordingly；　it　has　been　expressly　decided；　where　a　man　found　logs　afloat　and　moored　them；　but　they　again　broke　loose　and　floated　away；　and　were　found　by　another；　that　the　first　finder　retained　the　rights　which　sprung　from　his　having　taken　possession；　and　that　he　could　maintain　trover　against　the　second　finder；　who　refused　to　give　them　up。　/1/

Suppose　that　a　finder　of　a　purse　of　gold　has　left　it　in　his　country…house；　which　is　lonely　and　slightly　barred；　and　he　is　a　hundred　miles　away；　in　prison。　The　only　person　within　twenty　miles　is　a　thoroughly　equipped　burglar　at　his　front　door；　who　has　seen　the　purse　through　a　window；　and　who　intends　forthwith　to　enter　and　take　it。　The　finder's　power　to　reproduce　his　former　physical　relation　to　the　gold　is　rather　limited；　yet　I　believe　that　no　one　would　say　that　his　possession　was　at　an　end　until　the　burglar；　by　an　overt　＇238＇　act；　had　manifested　his　power　and　intent　to　exclude　others　from　the　purse。　The　reason　for　this　is　the　same　which　has　been　put　with　regard　to　the　power　to　exclude　at　the　moment　of　gaining　possession。　The　law　deals；　for　the　most　part；　with　overt　acts　and　facts　which　can　be　known　by　the　senses。　So　long　as　the　burglar　has　not　taken　the　purse；　he　has　not　manifested　his　intent；　and　until　he　breaks　through　the　barrier　which　measures　the　present　possessor's　power　of　excluding　him；　he　has　not　manifested　his　power。　It　may　be　observed　further；　that；　according　to　the　tests　adopted　in　this　Lecture；　the　owner　of　the　house　has　a　present　possession　in　the　strictest　sense；　because；　although　he　has　not　the　power　which　Savigny　says　is　necessary；　he　has　the　present　intent　and　power　to　exclude　others。

It　is　conceivable　that　the　common　law　should　go　so　far　as