the common law- 第22部分

Nor　is　this　all。　The　law　pursuing　its　course　of　specification；　as　explained　in　the　last　Lecture；　decides　what　is　the　tendency　of　representations　in　certain　cases；as；　for　instance；　that　a　horse　is　sound　at　the　time　of　making　a　＇135＇　sale；　or；　in　general；　of　any　statement　of　fact　which　it　is　known　the　other　party　intends　to　rely　on。　Beyond　these　scientific　rules　lies　the　vague　realm　of　the　jury。

The　other　moral　element　in　deceit　is　knowledge　that　the　statement　was　false。　With　this　I　am　not　strictly　concerned；　because　all　that　is　necessary　is　accomplished　when　the　elements　of　risk　are　reduced　to　action　and　knowledge。　But　it　will　aid　in　the　general　object　of　showing　that　the　tendency　of　the　law　everywhere　is　to　transcend　moral　and　reach　external　standards；　if　this　knowledge　of　falsehood　can　be　transmuted　into　a　formula　not　necessarily　importing　guilt；　although；　of　course；　generally　accompanied　by　it　in　fact。　The　moment　we　look　critically　at　it；　we　find　the　moral　side　shade　away。

The　question　is；　what　known　circumstances　are　enough　throw　the　risk　of　a　statement　upon　him　who　makes　it；　if　it　induces　another　man　to　act；　and　it　turns　out　untrue。　Now；　it　is　evident　that　a　man　may　take　the　risk　of　his　statement　by　express　agreement；　or　by　an　implied　one　which　the　law　reads　into　his　bargain。　He　may　in　legal　language　warrant　the　truth　of　it；　and　if　it　is　not　true；　the　law　treats　it　as　a　fraud；　just　as　much　when　he　makes　it　fully　believing　it；　as　when　he　knows　that　it　is　untrue；　and　means　to　deceive。　If；　in　selling　a　horse；　the　seller　warranted　him　to　be　only　five　years　old；　and　in　fact　he　was　thirteen；　the　seller　could　be　sued　for　a　deceit　at　common　law；　although　he　thought　the　horse　was　only　five。　/1/　The　common…law　liability　for　the　truth　of　statements　is；　therefore；　more　extensive　than　the　sphere　of　actual　moral　fraud。　But；　again；　it　is　enough　in　general　if　a　representation　＇136＇　is　made　recklessly；　without　knowing　whether　it　is　true　or　false。　Now　what　does　〃recklessly〃　mean。　It　does　not　mean　actual　personal　indifference　to　the　truth　of　the　statement。　It　means　only　that　the　data　for　the　statement　were　so　far　insufficient　that　a　prudent　man　could　not　have　made　it　without　leading　to　the　inference　that　he　was　indifferent。　That　is　to　say；　repeating　an　analysis　which　has　been　gone　through　with　before；　it　means　that　the　law；　applying　a　general　objective　standard；　determines　that；　if　a　man　makes　his　statement　on　those　data；　he　is　liable；　whatever　was　the　state　of　his　mind；　and　although　he　individually　may　have　been　perfectly　free　from　wickedness　in　making　it。

Hence　similar　reasoning　to　that　which　has　been　applied　already　to　intent　may　be　applied　to　knowledge　of　falsity。　Actual　knowledge　may　often　be　easier　to　prove　than　that　the　evidence　was　insufficient　to　warrant　the　statement；　and　when　proved　it　contains　the　lesser　element。　But　as　soon　as　the　lesser　element　is　shown　to　be　enough；　it　is　shown　that　the　law　is　ready　to　apply　an　external　or　objective　standard　here　also。

Courts　of　equity　have　laid　down　the　doctrine　in　terms　which　are　so　wholly　irrespective　of　the　actual　moral　condition　of　the　defendant　as　to　go　to　an　opposite　extreme。　It　is　said　that　〃when　a　representation　in　a　matter　of　business　is　made　by　one　man　to　another　calculated　to　induce　him　to　adapt　his　conduct　to　it；　it　is　perfectly　immaterial　whether　the　representation　is　made　knowing　it　to　be　untrue；　or　whether　it　is　made　believing　it　to　be　true；　if；　in　fact；　it　was　untrue。〃　/1/

Perhaps　the　actual　decisions　could　be　reconciled　on　a　＇137＇　narrower　principle；　but　the　rule　just　stated　goes　the　length　of　saying　that　in　business　matters　a　man　makes　every　statement　（of　a　kind　likely　to　be　acted　on）　at　his　peril。　This　seems　hardly　justifiable　in　policy。　The　moral　starting　point　of　liability　in　general　should　never　be　forgotten；　and　the　law　cannot　without　disregarding　it　hold　a　man　answerable　for　statements　based　on　facts　which　would　have　convinced　a　wise　and　prudent　man　of　their　truth。　The　public　advantage　and　necessity　of　freedom　in　imparting　information；　which　privileges　even　the　slander　of　a　third　person；　ought　a　fortiori；　it　seems　to　me；　to　privilege　statements　made　at　the　request　of　the　party　who　complains　of　them。

The　common　law；　at　any　rate；　preserves　the　reference　to　morality　by　making　fraud　the　ground　on　which　it　goes。　It　does　not　hold　that　a　man　always　speaks　at　his　peril。　But　starting　from　the　moral　ground；　it　works　out　an　external　standard　of　what　would　be　fraudulent　in　the　average　prudent　member　of　the　community；　and　requires　every　member　at　his　peril　to　avoid　that。　As　in　other　cases；　it　is　gradually　accumulating　precedents　which　decide　that　certain　statements　under　certain　circumstances　are　at　the　peril　of　the　party　who　makes　them。

The　elements　of　deceit　which　throw　the　risk　of　his　conduct　upon　a　party　are　these。　First；　making　a　statement　of　facts　purporting　to　be　serious。　Second；　the　known　presence　of　another　within　hearing。　Third；　known　facts　sufficient　to　warrant　the　expectation　or　suggest　the　probability　that　the　other　party　will　act　on　the　statement。　（What　facts　are　sufficient　has　been　specifically　determined　by　the　courts　in　some　instances；　in　others；　no　doubt；　the　question　would　go　to　the　jury　on　the　principles　heretofore　explained。）　Fourth；　the　＇138＇　falsehood　of　the　statement。　This　must　be　known；　or　else　the　known　evidence　concerning　the　matter　of　the　statement　must　be　such　as　would　not　warrant　belief　according　to　the　ordinary　course　of　human　experience。　（On　this　point　also　the　court　may　be　found　to　lay　down　specific　rules　in　some　cases。　/1/）

I　next　take　up　the　law　of　slander。　It　has　often　been　said　that　malice　is　one　of　the　elements　of　liability；　and　the　doctrine　is　commonly　stated　in　this　way：　that　malice　must　exist；　but　that　it　is　presumed　by　law　from　the　mere　speaking　of　the　words；　that　again　you　may　rebut　this　presumption　of　malice　by　showing　that　the　words　were　spoken　under　circumstances　which　made　the　communication　privileged；　as；　for　instance；　by　a　lawyer　in　the　necessary　course　of　his　argument；　or　by　a　person　answering　in　good　faith　to　inquiries　as　to　the　character　of　a　former　servant；…　and　then；　it　is　said；　the　plaintiff　may　meet　this　defence　in　some　cases　by　showing　that　the　words　were　spoken　with　actual　malice。

All　this　sounds　as　if　at　least　actual　intent　to　cause　the　damage　complained　of；　if　not　malevolence；　were　at　the　bottom　of　this　class　of　wrongs。　Yet　it　is　not　so。　For　although　the　use　of　the　phrase　〃malice〃　points　as　usual　to　an　original　moral　standard；　the　rule　that　it　is　presumed　upon　proof　of　speaking　certain　words　is　equivalent　to　saying　that　the　overt　conduct　of　speaking　those　words　may　be　actionable　whether　the　consequence　of　damage　to　the　plaintiff　was　intended　or　not。　And　this　fails　in　with　the　general　theory；　because　the　manifest　tendency　of　slanderous　words　is　to　harm　the　person　of　whom　they　are　spoken。　Again；　the　real　substance　of　the　defence　is　not　that　the　damage　＇139＇　was　not　intended；　　that　would　be　no　defence　at　all；　but　that；　whether　it　was　intended　or　not；that　is；　even　if　the　defendant　foresaw　it　and　foresaw　it　with　pleasure；the　manifest　facts　and　circumstances　under　which　he　said　it　were　such　that　the　law　considered　the　damage　to　the　plaintiff　of　less　importance　than　the　benefit　of　free　speaking。

It　is　more　difficult　to　apply　the　same　analysis　to　the　last　stage　of　the　process；　but　perhaps　it　is　not　impossible。　It　is　said　that　the　plaintiff　may　meet　a　case　of　privilege　thus　made　out　on　the　part　of　the　defendant；　by　proving　actual　malice；　that　is；　actual　intent　to　cause　the　damage　complained　of。　But　how　is　this　actual　malice　made　out？　It　is　by　showing　that　the　defendant　knew　the　statement　which　he　made　was　false；　or　that　his　untrue　statements　were　grossly　in　excess　of　what　the　occasion　required。　Now　is　it　not　very　evident　that　the　law　is　looking　to　a　wholly　different　matter　from　the　defendant's　intent？　The　fact　that　the　defendant　foresaw　and　foresaw　with　pleasure　the　damage　to　the　plaintiff；　is　of　no　more　importance　in　this　case　than　it　would　be　where　the　communication　was　privileged。　The　question　again　is　wholly　a　question　of　knowledge；　or　other　external　standard。　And　what　makes　even　knowledge　important？　It　is　that　the　reason　for　which　a　man　is　allowed　in　the　other　instances　to　make　false　charges　against　his　neighbors　is　wanting。　It　is　for　the　public　interest　that　people　should　be　free　to　give　the　best　information　they　can　under　certain　circumstances　without　fear；　but　there　is　no　public　benefit　in　having　lies　told　at　any　time；　and　when　a　charge　is　known　to　be　false；　or　is　in　excess　of　what　is　required　by　the　occasion；　it　is　not　necessary　to　make　that　charge　in　order　to　speak　freely；　and　＇140＇　therefore　it　falls　under　the　ordinary　rule；　that　certain　charges　are　made　at　the　party's　peril　in　case　they　turn　out　to　be　false；　whether　evil　consequences　were　intended　or　not。　The　defendant　is　liable；　not　because　his　intent　was　evil；　but　because　he　made　false　charges　without　excuse。

It　will　be　seen　that　the　peril　of　conduct　here　begins　farther　back　than　with　deceit；　as　the　tendency　of　slander　is　more　universally　harmful。　There　must　be　some　concomitant　circumstances。　There　must　at　least　be　a　human　being　in　existence　whom　the　statement　designates。　There　must　be　another　human　being　within　hearing　who　understands　the　statement；　and　the　statement　must　be　false。　But　it　is　arguable　that　the　latter　of　these　facts　need　not　be　known；　as　certainly　the　falsity　of　the　charge　need　not　be；　and　that　a　man　must　take　the　risk　of　even　an　idle　statement　being　heard；　unless　he　made　it　under　known　circumstances　of　privilege。　It　would　be　no　great　curtailment　of　freedom　to　deny　a　man　immunity　in　attaching　a　charge　of　crime　to　the　name　of　his　neighbor；　even　when　he　supposes　himself　alone。　But　it　does　not　seem　clear　that　the　law　would　go　quite　so　far　as　that。

The　next　form　of　liability　is　comparatively　insignificant。　I　mean　the　action　for　malicious　prosecution。　A　man　may　recover　damages　against　another　for　maliciously　and　without　probable　cause　instituting　a　criminal；　or；　in　some　cases；　a　civil　prosecution　against　him　upon　a　false　charge。　The　want　of　probable　cause　refers；　of　course；　only　to　the　state　of　the　defendant's　knowledge；　not　to　his　int